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Short Report
Some theories propose that tools become incorporated 
into the neural representation of the hands (a process 
known as tool embodiment; Maravita & Iriki, 2004). 
Others suggest that conceptual body representation is 
rigid and that experience with one’s own body is insuf-
ficient for adapting bodily cognition, as shown in indi-
viduals born without hands (Vannuscorps & Caramazza, 
2016) and in amputees with persistent phantom hand 
representation (Kikkert et al., 2016). How sharp is the 
conceptual boundary between hands and tools? This 
question is particularly relevant for individuals who have 
lost one hand and use prosthetic hands as tools to sup-
plement their missing hand function. Although both con-
genital one-handers (i.e., amelia patients) and one-handed 
amputees are encouraged to use prostheses, the former 
show a greater tendency than the latter to use prosthetic 
hands in daily tasks ( Jang et al., 2011). One-handers have 
a fully functional remaining hand (allowing them to use 
handheld tools, etc.), which makes them less likely to 
show semantic distortions in hand and tool representa-
tion. However, their bodies and their interactions with 
their environment are fundamentally altered by their dis-
ability (Makin et al., 2013; Makin, Wilf, Schwartz, & 
Zohary, 2010).
To determine how real-world experience shapes con-
ceptual categorization of hands, tools, and prostheses, 
we recruited one-handers with congenital or acquired 
unilateral hand loss to take part in a study involving a 
priming task. We predicted that one-handers, particularly 
congenital one-handers, would show more conceptual 
blurring between hands and tools than control partici-
pants would, as a result of less experience with a hand 
and more reliance on prostheses (which are essentially 
tools) for typical hand functions. We further predicted 
that individual differences in prosthesis usage would be 
reflected in implicit categorization of hands, manual 
tools, and prostheses.
Method
Twenty-four one-handers (12 born without a hand and 
12 who lost a hand through amputation) and 21 matched 
control participants performed a visual priming task in 
which they verbally categorized target images of hands 
and tools (Fig. 1a). On each trial, participants saw a prime 
stimulus followed by a target stimulus, each of which 
appeared for 32 ms (stimulus onset asynchrony = 600 
ms). On baseline trials, the prime was always a scram-
bled image, and on experimental trials, the prime could 
be an image of a hand, a tool, or a prosthesis. On all tri-
als, the target was either a hand or a tool. Participants 
were instructed to ignore the prime and to verbally report 
whether the target image was a hand or a tool. Time from 
the start of the target display to voice onset was recorded 
as the participants’ reaction time (RT). Participants com-
pleted 40 baselines trials and four blocks (60 trials each) 
of experimental trials.
Ten different exemplars were used as prime and target 
items in each category (for example stimuli, see Fig. S1 in 
the Supplemental Material available online). Hand and 
prosthesis images showed the side of the participants’ 
missing hand (one-handers) or nondominant hand (con-
trols). When possible, images were of the participant’s 
own prosthesis, so daily prosthesis usage (assessed both 
by asking how often participants wore their prosthesis 
and by using an adapted version of the Motor Activity 
Log; Makin et al., 2013) generally reflected individuals’ 
experience with the prime prosthesis image presented to 
them (see the Supplemental Material for additional meth-
odological details).
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Results
We first examined the prime-target congruency effect on 
trials with hand and tool primes in one-handers and con-
trol participants. RTs for controls were slower when the 
prime and target were congruent (i.e., from the same 
category; e.g., hand prime and hand target) than when 
they were incongruent (i.e., from different categories; 
e.g., hand prime and tool target), which indicates same-
category prime interference in target processing (Boy & 
Sumner, 2010; see also Vainio, 2011, for negative stimu-
lus-response compatibility for hand images). Next, a 2 
(prime) × 2 (target) × 2 (group) repeated measures analy-
sis of variance revealed a significant three-way interac-
tion, F(1, 43) = 5.37, p = .025; this indicates that, unlike 
the results for control participants, the priming effect was 
absent in one-handers (for further analysis, see Results 
and Fig. S2 in the Supplemental Material). In control par-
ticipants, we found a significant Prime × Target interaction, 
F(1, 20) = 11.24, p = .003. Further, planned comparisons 
using paired-samples t tests revealed a significant RT 
difference between congruent and incongruent trials for 
both hand targets, t(20) = 2.19, p = .041, d = 0.175, and 
tool targets, t(20) = 3.31, p = .003, d = 0.261. However, in 
one-handers, there was no significant Prime × Target 
interaction (F < 1), which suggests that the conceptual 
hand-tool category boundary is blurred in one-handers, 
compared with control participants.
We calculated each participant’s congruency effect by 
subtracting mean RTs on incongruent trials from mean 
RTs on congruent trials. Given our finding that control 
participants’ RTs were slower on congruent than on 
incongruent trials, a greater congruency effect reflects 
greater dissociation between hands and tools. Although 
one-handers did not show a significant congruency 
effect, there was evidence that their categorization behav-
ior was modulated by their case histories, specifically the 
age at which one-handed amputees lost their hand and 
their habitual prosthesis usage. We found a significant 
correlation between age at hand loss and congruency 
effect, r(10) = .65, p = .022 (Fig. 1b): Hand loss earlier in 
life related to weaker congruency effects, whereas ampu-
tees who lost a hand later in life (and therefore had more 
experience with the now-missing hand) showed greater 
congruency effects. These findings suggest that the con-
ceptual distinction between hands and tools develops 
through experience with natural hands. We also found 
that one-handers who used their prosthesis more tended 
to show weaker congruency effects than those who 
used prostheses less frequently—correlation between 
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Fig. 1. Experimental procedure and results. On each trial (a), participants saw a 32-ms prime stimulus followed by a 32-ms target stimulus, with a 
600-ms stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA). Participants were asked to make a speeded, forced-choice verbal response as to whether the target was a 
hand or a tool. Baseline trials differed from experimental trials only in that the prime was a scrambled image rather than an image of a hand, tool, 
or prosthesis. Reaction times on incongruent trials (in which prime and target stimuli were from different categories) were subtracted from reaction 
times on congruent trials (in which prime and target stimuli were from the same category) to calculate the hand-tool congruency effect. The scatter 
plot (b; with best-fitting regression line) shows the mean hand-tool congruency effect as a function of age at hand loss for congenital one-handers 
and one-handed amputees, along with the mean congruency effect for control participants.
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congruency effect and prosthesis usage: r(22) = −.38, p = 
.068—such that the hand-tool category boundary 
(reflected in the congruency effect) tended to blur with 
the regularity of prosthesis usage.
Theories of tool embodiment state that prosthesis 
usage should result in categorization of the prosthesis as 
a hand (Murray, 2008). In the final set of analyses, we 
assessed the degree to which prosthesis primes affected 
responses to hands and tools as a function of prosthesis 
experience. Given that categorical similarity resulted in 
slower responses for congruent prime-target pairs than 
for incongruent prime-target pairs, slowing of RTs for 
prosthesis primes can be taken to reflect the conceptual 
similarity between prostheses and hands or tools. To 
investigate this, we ran a backwards regression analysis 
on RTs for prosthesis-hand trials using age at hand loss, 
years since hand loss, prosthesis usage, congruency 
effect size, and mean RT on baseline trials as predictors. 
The final model for hand-target trials, F(2, 21) = 35.08, 
p < .001, R = .88, adjusted R2 = .75, included age at hand 
loss, β = −0.29, t(23) = −2.72, p = .013, and baseline RT, 
β = 0.78, t(23) = 7.28, p < .001 (see Fig. S3 in the Supple-
mental Material). This analysis revealed that people who 
lost their hand earlier in life showed greater conceptual 
similarity between the prosthesis and hands. We also ran 
a backwards regression analysis on RTs for prosthesis-tool 
trials using the same parameters as for the previous set of 
backwards regressions. The final model, F(2, 21) = 42.48, 
p  < .001, R = .90, adjusted R2 = .78, included prosthesis 
usage, β = 0.24, t(23) = 2.39, p = .026, and baseline RT, β = 
0.83, t(23) = 8.36, p < .001 (Fig. S4 in the Supplemental 
Material). This analysis showed that, in opposition to the 
previous regression, the conceptual relationship between 
prostheses and tools was best predicted by prosthesis usage, 
with participants who used their prostheses more showing 
greater conceptual similarity between prostheses and tools.
Conclusion
Together, our findings demonstrate that categorization of 
hands and tools in one-handers depends on both prior 
experience with a natural hand before amputation and 
later artificial-hand usage. Specifically, dissociation bet-
ween hands and tools (exemplified by the congruency 
effect) depends on the degree of experience with that 
hand. Moreover, the representation of prostheses as hands 
and tools depends on daily life experience. Given the 
relatively limited semantic-category deficit but profoundly 
changed body experience resulting from hand loss, we 
suggest that the adaptable conceptual relationship 
between hands, tools, and prostheses is embodied. Never-
theless, because high-level lexico-semantic processing may 
implicitly depend on body representation (Rueschemeyer, 
Pfeiffer, & Bekkering, 2010), further studies are necessary 
to elucidate the underlying process.
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